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Economic Analysis in Law 
Hanoch Dagan† & Roy Kreitner†† 
This Essay explores the relationship between normative law and eco-
nomics and legal theory. We claim that legal theory must account for law’s 
coerciveness, normativity, and institutional structure. Economic analyses 
that engage these features are an integral part of legal theory, rather than 
external observations about law from an economic perspective. These 
analyses, or economic analysis in law, play a crucial role in understanding 
the law and in developing legal policy arguments. After establishing eco-
nomic analysis in law’s terminology, this Essay maps out three contribu-
tions of economic analysis in law: prescriptive recommendations in areas 
amenable to preference satisfaction as a normative criterion, analyzing ef-
ficiency as one aspect of a broader normative inquiry, and exposing feasi-
bility constraints. Finally, this Essay turns to an exploration of possibilities 
for extending economic analysis in law beyond its comfort zone. It suggests 
that economic analysis might expand into areas where values other than 
preference satisfaction are or ought to be dominant considerations. 
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Introduction 
Like other extra-legal disciplines, economics has long been an im-
portant source of valuable insights about law. Over the past half-century, 
the economic analysis of law has become one of the dominant modes of 
thinking about law and policy, and as such, one of the most important 
members in the family of discourses about law. In this Essay, we aim to 
spotlight those aspects of normative law and economics that cross the po-
rous boundary from discourses about law and take their place as integral, 
internal parts of legal theory. 
According to this characterization, legal theory focuses on the work 
of society’s coercive normative institutions, taking each element in this 
triad seriously. Legal theory does not arise in an academic vacuum; it is 
open to methodological and thematic lessons from other disciplines. How-
ever, rather than straightforward application of other disciplinary tools to 
legal materials, legal theory engages in a distinctive mode of inquiry. It 
concentrates on the relationship between law’s normativity and its coer-
civeness, and on the implications of law’s institutional structures. A funda-
mental entailment of these relationships is the recognition that law’s coer-
cive power raises demanding justificatory constraints. One such constraint, 
and our focus in this Essay, is the demand of public reason, or the claim 
that legal prescriptions must appeal to normatively acceptable and openly 
accessible reasons. 
To clarify this point, consider the following difference between a dis-
course about law and legal theory. A sociological account of law may sat-
isfy itself by observing regularities in obeisance to a norm by a group of 
people,1 even if compliance with the norm is based on what may be called 
non-normative reasons (terror, belief in magic, etc.). Legal theory, by con-
trast, cannot make do without at least some account of normativity; it must, 
in other words, consider the law as purporting to claim legitimate author-
ity. In what follows, we assume that the reasons that ground law’s claim to 
authority should ultimately express humanist commitments to self-deter-
mination and equality.2 
Distinguishing legal theory from other discourses about law is not an 
exercise in ranking the desirability of academic disciplines. Scholarly anal-
yses that do not engage directly with normativity expand the understand-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 1. People may be the addressees of primary norms, for example, do not drive over sixty-
five miles per hour, or addressees of secondary norms of the type addressed to people generally 
and often specially tailored for legal officials, such as judges. The most jurisprudentially familiar 
secondary norm is H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition, which prescribes “the ways in which the pri-
mary rules may be conclusively ascertained.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92 (1961). 
 2. This statement is posited for purposes of discussion, and its controversial nature does 
not concern us here. At the level of generality stated, and for at least ostensibly liberal polities 
that command our attention here, we believe it serves as an easily acceptable baseline. Delineating 
the particularities of such a baseline is a difficult endeavor, but avoiding some form of normative 
commitment is not possible for a legal theory. 
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ing of legal phenomena. But without some account of underlying justifica-
tion, these discourses about law cannot offer grounds for normative con-
clusions; nor can they fully account for the workings or the products of le-
gal institutions. The point of developing this terminology, thus, has little to 
do with policing its boundaries. It is instead oriented towards clarifying the 
possible role of academic work in normative argument. 
Accordingly, economic analysis in law stands for those economic anal-
yses of law that advance or rely on some engagement with law’s norma-
tivity, or in other words, its reasons for binding the actors subject to law. 
Additionally, such an engagement must, at least in theory, open up its 
claims to reasoned argument, rather than offering a “black box” that pur-
ports to produce a result. In this sense, its arguments must align with the 
requirements of public reason. In this Essay we focus on normative law and 
economics, that is, on economic analyses that seek to prescribe what the 
law should be or how we should understand it.3 
Viewing economic analysis within legal theory along these lines func-
tions as a double invitation: it is at once a call to economically oriented 
scholars to engage directly with the core questions of justification that an-
imate legal theory, and a call to non-economically oriented scholars to 
grapple with economic insight.4 These invitations inform the two goals of 
this Essay: first, to highlight aspects of normative law and economics that 
non-economically oriented legal scholars ought not ignore; second, to plot 
out one possible trajectory for developing economic analysis in legal the-
ory, by expanding its tools to deal head on with values that are irreducible 
to aggregate preference satisfaction.  
Part II addresses our first goal. It offers a tentative map of three gen-
res of economic analysis in legal theory that pervade contemporary nor-
mative discourse. Part III turns to our second goal, which is more specula-
tive. The aim here is to explore economic analysis’s potential outside its 
comfort zone. We should clarify upfront that the comfort zone to which we 
refer merely describes the existing mainstream of normative law and eco-
nomics.5 Indeed, part of the point of Part III is to destabilize this by-no-
means necessary state of affairs.6 But before we turn to these tasks, Part I 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 3. We believe our discussion has potential implications for empirical scholarship as well, 
especially on the level of research design. See Hanoch Dagan, Roy Kreitner & Tamar Kricheli-
Katz, Legal Theory for Legal Empiricists, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 292 (2018). 
 4. Cf. EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY 3 (2010) 
(developing a framework of incorporating “threshold deontology” into economic cost-benefit analy-
sis). 
 5. See Eric A. Posner, The Boundaries of Normative Law and Economics, 38 YALE J. 
ON REG. 657 (2021). Thus, at least some views on distributive justice—those that can be captured 
by a social welfare function—may be deemed well within the economic “comfort zone,” since wel-
fare economics allows for many different social welfare functions. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 28-38 (2002). 
 6. We thus read Lewis Kornhauser’s claim, in his rich Comment on this Essay, that “eco-
nomic analysts already pursue these” inquiries or, at the very least, have laid the groundwork for 
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offers an account of the character of legal theory and the constraints of 
public reason. 
I. Legal Theory and Public Reason 
A. Discourse About Law and Legal Theory 
Law, like economics, can be investigated from internal or external 
perspectives. Studied externally, law serves as the source of data that is the 
object of study by scholars who employ their own extra-legal theory or 
methodology. Studied from within, law comes with its own constitutive fea-
tures, the characteristics that make it what it is. Admittedly, few accounts 
(if any) fully fit one polar perspective or the other. A professional historian 
who makes use of legal documents like court decisions, for example, needs 
to know something about the nature of law; some knowledge of law will be 
necessary to distinguish “legal” or “binding” documents from those with 
no validity or effect within the legal system. Many scholarly endeavors do 
not aspire to full autonomy but are attentive to lessons from neighboring 
disciplines. That said, these different perspectives—for our purposes, the 
perspective of a discourse about law on the one hand (or a discourse for 
which legal materials are sources of information about some wider phe-
nomenon) and that of legal theory on the other—present distinct types of 
work, with different points of focus. 
Legal theory, as we analyze it elsewhere in some detail,7 denotes the 
various accounts that, in studying either the law as a phenomenon or any 
specific legal field, explicitly or implicitly engage with law’s constitutive 
features. Legal theory follows jurisprudence in interrogating the law as a 
set of coercive normative institutions. Different legal theories offer differ-
ing accounts of the way law’s power and normativity align and how this 
discursive cohabitation manifests itself institutionally. To be sure, disci-
plines like sociology, philosophy, political science, and economics also of-
fer important insights on these three fronts: coerciveness, normativity, and 
institutions. But legal theory nonetheless has a distinctive signature, which 
lies at its simultaneous focus not only on what the law is but also on the 
standards by which it should be judged.8 For legal theorists, these three 
features of law and their complicated interactions imply answers on both 
descriptive and normative fronts. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
them, as largely supportive. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Non-Consequentialist Uses of Eco-
nomic Analysis: A Comment on Dagan and Kreitner, Economic Analysis in Law, 38 YALE J. ON 
REG. BULL. 159, 160 (2021). 
 7. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Character of Legal Theory, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 671 (2011).  
 8. See Julie Dickson, Is Bad Law Still Law? Is Bad Law Really Law?, in LAW AS 
INSTITUTIONAL NORMATIVE ORDER 161, 169-70, 174 (Maksymilian Del Mar & Zenon Bankow-
ski eds., 2009). 
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When law is used as raw material for the application of a non-legal 
disciplinary methodology or theory, these characteristics do not, and in-
deed need not, burden the analysis. For example, highly technical analyses 
of some legal questions handled by common law judges may yield valuable 
insights even when any attempt to translate them into legal prescriptions 
would be ill-advised given the institutional capacity of the pertinent legal 
actors. Legal theory, by contrast, must pay attention to this concern.9 Law 
is always institutionally embedded, and the capacities of existing or poten-
tial institutions can never be deemed irrelevant. It is no wonder that some 
of the leading works detailing the economic analysis involved in, for exam-
ple, contract law, focus on these institutional concerns and how they should 
constrain the use of substantive economic considerations in the design of 
contractual rules and doctrines.10 
Our focus here, though, is not on legal theory’s sensitivity to institu-
tions, but rather on its attention to the idea that power and reason are both 
endemic to law. Law implicates power both because judgments prescribed 
by law recruit the state’s force to back them, and because of the institu-
tional and discursive features that tend to disguise or downplay the ele-
ment of force.11 This is why internal juristic discourse is likely to be not 
only justificatory, but apologetic. Recognizing this tendency, legal theory 
must establish at least a modicum of critical distance from practical jurists’ 
proffered reasoning. At the same time, legal theory at its best resists reduc-
ing law merely to parochial interests or power politics. It recognizes that 
modes of legal reasoning—substantive and technical, abstract and contex-
tual—often constrain the sense of choice available to legal decision-makers 
in directions that transcend their self and group interests. In the best case, 
legal reasoning must aspire to appeal beyond the parochial, and instances 
of argumentation exposed as a cover for interest are treated as cases of 
abuse.12 
Again, other disciplines’ inquiries of law often ignore law’s norma-
tivity (or its element of force). This disposition is, at times, quite beneficial, 
as the case of the sociological account that exposes legal pathologies (such 
as compliance driven by terror) with which we started demonstrates. Sim-
ilar insights drive economic analyses of the way legal actors may maximize 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 9. Thus, there may be an ideal theory of how to make a decision that requires a great 
deal of information and technical capacity, and developing that ideal may yield insight. However, 
if the matter is typically handled by common law decision procedures (and not by the idealized 
decision-maker), the fact that judges have neither the information nor the technical (institutional) 
capacity would be not simply relevant, but very weighty. In some cases, this may call for a legal 
reform of transferring jurisdiction to another institution, such as an administrative agency manned 
by experts. 
 10. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Con-
tract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 598 (2003). 
 11. Here we refer notably to the institutional division of labor between “interpretation 
specialists” and the actual executors of their judgments, and to our tendency as lawyers and even 
as citizens, to “thingify” legal constructs and accord them an aura of naturalness and acceptability.  
 12. For a poignant example—an exception that proves the rule—see Republic of Bolivia 
v. Philip Morris Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 
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their self-interest while developing, interpreting, or applying the law.13 But 
it is legal theory that tells us that cases in which law is reduced to brute 
power or interest are indeed pathologies (as H.L.A. Hart’s distinction be-
tween the power of the law and that of the gunman famously highlights).14 
Law is often unjustified; like other social practices it can, and often does, 
fail in complying with its task of providing people justifiable reasons for 
action. But normative legal theory is nonetheless informative because it 
defines what counts as success and what counts as failure. 
Indeed, the proposition that the requirement of justifiability is consti-
tutive of law is not a relic of a romantic conception of the law. Quite the 
contrary: it is at least implicit in any approach that engages in, or seeks to 
comprehend, evaluation of the law or its critique. Thus, as Karl Llewellyn 
explained, while “distortion to wrong ends [and] abuse for profit or favor” 
are part of the life of the law, they are always deemed to be disruptions, 
which are “desperately bad,” exactly because there is “in every ‘legal’ 
structure . . . [an implicit] recognition of duty to make good.”15 This de-
mand of justification is not just “an ethical demand upon the system 
(though it is [also] that).”16 Rather, it is “an element conceived to be always 
and strongly present in urge,” one that cannot be “negated by the most 
cynical egocentric who ever ran” the legal system.17 Similarly, Joseph Raz 
wrote that law’s claim to authority implies that law must present itself as 
making genuine moral demands and that it is thus “essential to the law that 
it recognizes that its use of power is answerable to moral standards.”18 
B. Economic Analysis of Law and in Law 
Since part of what it means to justify law’s authority is to understand 
law as a means to human ends, legal theory searches for sources of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 13. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legis-
latures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995). 
 14. See HART, supra note 1, at 82-85 (distinguishing between the gunman’s commands 
and law’s prescriptions, which are reasons for action). 
 15. K.N. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juris-
tic Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355, 1385 (1940). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. Llewellyn’s last proposition is echoed in leading accounts of the incentives that 
motivate judges as rational maximizers. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: 
A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 18, 90, 106 (2006) (describing how judges are motivated 
by their political preferences, which are, at bottom, driven by ideals about the common good); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 11-12, 60-61, 371 (2008) (explaining how either be-
cause they are driven by a “desire for self-respect and for respect from other judges and legal 
professionals,” or due to “the intrinsic satisfactions of judging,” judges are mostly motivated by “a 
taste for being a good judge,” which “requires conformity to the accepted norms of judging”). 
 18. JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF 
LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 1, 177-78, 180 (2009). In other words, our focus in this Essay on 
law’s normativity should not be interpreted as marginalization of power. Quite the contrary: the 
requirement that law offers acceptable justification is urgent because law is in the business of mo-
nopolizing (legitimized) force in society, and this burden of justification by reference to the hu-
manist commitment to self-determination and equality is exactly what preserves the possibility of 
criticizing existing law and recruiting law for morally required social change. 
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knowledge about the state of the world on which legal norms and institu-
tions have an impact, and about the possible effects of the law on that 
world. This is one sense in which current legal theory differs from tradi-
tional jurisprudence: rather than aspiring to establish law as an autono-
mous discipline, it reaches out for lessons from interfacing disciplines of 
the social sciences and the humanities.19 Economics is a major source of 
such lessons. 
Standard works in normative law and economics study the incentive 
effects of legal rules and doctrines and examine how they fare vis-à-vis the 
normative criterion of maximizing aggregate preference satisfaction.20 The 
way law’s prescriptions are translated into incentives is clearly relevant to 
legal theory, and understanding that translation requires considering the 
behavior of law’s subjects (we the people) and its various carriers (judges, 
administrators, sheriffs and the like). Thus, the gap between economic 
analysis of law and economic analysis in law does not relate to the reliance 
on incentives. Rather, it focuses on the typical reference to maximizing ag-
gregate preference satisfaction as the analysis’s normative guideline. 
Legal theories in which law should be indifferent to people’s prefer-
ence satisfaction mark an extreme version of this gap.21 But this position is 
an outlier. Most legal theories accept that in some contexts, preference sat-
isfaction is a proper normative guideline for the law. The reasons offered 
for respecting preferences are varied, but they seem to converge around 
the humanist commitment to self-determination and equality, which im-
plies that satisfying people’s preferences is normatively significant because 
these preferences both reflect and serve people’s life plans. In this more 
common position, the reason for the gap between economic analysis of law 
and economic analysis in law does not derive from the inadmissibility of 
preference satisfaction. Rather, it focuses on the unacceptability of assum-
ing maximizing aggregate preference satisfaction as the sole or ultimate 
normative commitment of the law. The claim has two related parts: first, 
preference satisfaction is not always necessarily valuable, as its value in-
heres in, and is thus limited by the more fundamental value it reflects or 
serves; second, there are indeed more fundamental normative commit-
ments to which the law should respond. 
Some theorists are likely to push back even against this claim and ar-
gue that any other normative value—be it objective well-being, autonomy, 
democracy, or distributive justice (and the list can go further, of course)—
                                                                                                                                                                                
 19. See Dagan & Kreitner, supra note 7, at 685-89. 
 20. See, e.g., ZAMIR & MEDINA, supra note 4, at 12; Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Domain 
of Preference, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 717 (2003); Roy Kreitner, Anti-Preferences, 22 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 2021). While we do not believe that preference satisfaction is plausible 
as the exclusive goal of normative theory, we think it is clearly plausible as one normative goal 
among others. 
 21. One extreme example comes from Kantian legal theories. See, e.g., ARTHUR 
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2009). These 
theories also marginalize law’s effects.  
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is important only because it reflects people’s preferences or is otherwise 
conducive to the goal of maximizing their satisfaction.22 
However, economic analysis as a method does not require this nor-
mative position. In fact, there are obvious reasons to believe that most legal 
economists operate within a very different set of normative commitments. 
They do not think, for example, that the wrongness of slavery depends 
upon its (necessarily contingent) incentive effects, or that democracy or 
distributive justice are justified only to the extent that they reflect people’s 
preferences. Experts in the methods of economics need not subscribe to 
the specific version of utilitarianism—maximizing aggregate preference 
satisfaction—that typifies many examples of these methods. Economic 
analysis of law may well generate insights on law even when it ignores val-
ues such as autonomy, democracy, or equality. But economic analysis need 
not be wedded to a particularly narrow normative vision. 
There is, of course, a voluminous literature on the validity of utilitar-
ian normative foundationalism, but our purpose is not to resolve this de-
bate. We assume that, just as legal theorists who find no value in preference 
satisfaction are unlikely to accept our invitation to engage with economic 
insights, adherents of utilitarian normative foundationalism are likely to 
reject the idea of any divergence between legal theory and economic anal-
ysis of law. This does not mean that Kantians (who subscribe to the former 
view) or utilitarians are not doing legal theory. Rather, it admittedly im-
plies that our notion of economic analysis in law is likely to be unaccepta-
ble—maybe even unintelligible—for these legal theorists and economic 
analysts. 
Acknowledging this limit of the possible power of our thesis allows us 
to refine our (tentative) characterization of the object of this Essay. Eco-
nomic analysis in law, as we understand it, is the body of existing and po-
tential economic studies of law or of its constituent branches, manifesta-
tions, or doctrines, which accept that law’s claim to legitimate authority 
ultimately expresses commitments to self-determination and equality. 
There is probably more than one way of grounding this premise and thus 
defining the scope and content of economic analysis in law, but for the pur-
poses of this exploratory Essay, one position suffices. 
Preferences, in this view, “are, in most cases, active attitudes which 
people hold for reasons,”23 and these reasons refer back either to people’s 
plans, projects, and goals, or to their normative convictions. Situating the 
satisfaction of people’s preferences in their life stories explains both its 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 22. Another possible response may be that the focus on maximizing preference satisfac-
tion is grounded in modesty regarding law’s ability to promote any other normative value. We 
accept this cautionary attitude and indeed think that scholarship that elucidates law’s feasibility 
constraints is invaluable to legal theory. See infra Part II.C. Of course, a cautionary attitude about 
feasibility need not translate into global skepticism. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 76-
86 (1986) (distinguishing between external and internal skepticism). 
 23. JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW 
AND POLITICS 112 (1994). 
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normative significance and why it cannot be foundational or even free-
standing. People’s preferences must be taken seriously because of their 
role as features of personal self-determination; and it is the maxim of 
equality that explains why preferences with equal intensity should be 
equally counted irrespective of the identity of their holder. Appreciating 
the way in which some of our preferences are grounded in normative con-
victions further refutes the plausibility of treating all preferences as 
“opaque natural events.”24 Together, both directions suggest that at times 
it is inappropriate to be guided—or solely guided—by the criterion of max-
imizing aggregate preference satisfaction. 
II. Mainstream Economic Analysis in Law 
A. Acceptable Monism 
We now turn to our first main task. In this Part we identify three ex-
isting forms of normative law and economics that are integral to legal the-
ory as we have described it, because they clearly comply with law’s justifi-
catory burden. The first genre is straightforward. There are economic 
accounts that deal with legal arrangements, which are amenable to monist 
economic analysis, because their reliance on preference maximization as a 
goal tracks normatively sustainable arguments for these particular con-
texts. 
Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott’s work on business contracts be-
tween firms provides a classic example. Schwartz and Scott focus on 
firms—entities that are “organized in the corporate form and [have] five 
or more employees” or else in limited or professional partnerships—so as 
to set aside concerns of systematic cognitive error.25 For purposes of devel-
oping their theory, they further assume there are no relevant externalities 
or rather that such externalities should be specifically targeted by, for ex-
ample, environmental and antitrust laws. For this externality-free, bias-
free, sophisticated commercial subset of the contractual universe, Schwartz 
and Scott identify the good of contracting as maximizing the parties’ joint 
gains, or the contractual surplus.26 Given this good, Schwartz and Scott 
claim that such commercial parties would prefer the state to provide a con-
tract law that restricts itself to the pursuit of efficiency.27 
One can argue against the more specific propositions that Schwartz 
and Scott derive from this premise, dispute their view that contracts be-
tween firms are “the main subject of what is commonly called contract 
law,”28 or take issue with the way they isolate the subset of contract law 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 24. Id. 
 25. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 545-46. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. at 544. 
 28. Id. 
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that, in their view, should focus solely on the parties’ preference satisfac-
tion. But these substantive debates need not detain us here. The important 
point for our purposes is that, at least for these authors, the claim for effi-
ciency monism in business contracts is founded on a commitment to “party 
sovereignty” that in this context is exhausted by maximizing their contrac-
tual surplus.29 
Before the interventions of Gary Becker,30 economic analysis was 
mostly geared toward such contexts, which are at least facially amenable 
to an acceptable normative focus solely on preference satisfaction. While 
it makes no sense to imagine turning back the clock, it is worth noting that 
outside these limited domains, overly hasty translations of all types of 
rights, interests, and reasons into the metric of preferences is problematic. 
But even for legal questions for which aggregate preference satisfaction 
cannot hope to be the sole normative consideration, two types of economic 
interventions may be important. 
B. Subcontracting 
The first intervention is straightforward. Legal theory need not en-
gage in an “all things considered” account of a legal phenomenon. How-
ever, when legal theory aspires to relevance for policy discussions, consid-
eration of a range of perspectives and values becomes pressing. Economic 
analysis can serve as a “subcontractor” of a more comprehensive norma-
tive account, offering, for example, the economic implications of compet-
ing arrangements for a policy question that requires consideration of both 
welfarist and non-welfarist concerns.31  
A canonical example of such a division of labor is Judge Guido Cala-
bresi’s The Costs of Accidents.32 Judge Calabresi sets out the policy ques-
tion surrounding accidents writ large as one that involves two principal 
goals: “First, it must be just or fair; second, it must reduce the costs of ac-
cidents.”33 He then goes on to posit that while justice is more difficult to 
pin down than economic efficiency, the determination of justice is of a dif-
ferent order than the determination of efficiency: it can neither be sub-
sumed to efficiency, nor ignored in any total evaluation of the system. His 
conclusion is clarifying: “An economically optimal system of reducing ac-
cident costs . . . might be totally or partially unacceptable because it strikes 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 29. See id. at 556. Other authors implicitly employ similar positions. See, e.g., VICTOR 
GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 2 (2006); STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 296-99 (2004). 
 30. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
(1976). 
 31. Often, the economic implications are presented not in terms of preference satisfac-
tion, but rather in other terms, such as cost reduction (as in the example that follows) or allocative 
efficiency. But these considerations are, in these views, desirable because they imply that more 
resources would be available for satisfying people’s preferences. 
 32. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
 33. Id. at 24. 
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us as unfair, and no amount of discussion of the efficiency of the system 
would do much to save it. Justice must ultimately have its due.”34 
For Judge Calabresi, the question of how to combine the analysis of 
justice with the analysis of efficiency poses a vexing problem in and of it-
self.35 While his recognition of different types or orders of normative goals 
is an important step, Judge Calabresi stops short of considering a direct 
engagement or combined evaluation of differing (and perhaps conflicting) 
normative orders. For him, amorphous normative intuitions potentially 
constrain the pursuit of efficiency, granting them a crucial but extremely 
circumscribed role in the analysis. This is disappointing for two reasons. 
First, it assumes that while efficiency analysis is rigorous, other normative 
considerations are little more than sentimental hand-waving about an au-
thor’s “sense of justice.”36 Second, and more important here, is that Judge 
Calabresi’s framing turns the analysis sideways by assuming that efficiency 
does the primary normative work, while other considerations may occa-
sionally appear to limit its applicability. From a more general perspective, 
however, it should be clear that efficiency analysis is one piece of a larger 
set of values that populate a more totalizing normative inquiry. 
Legal theory will not always engage in full-fledged totalizing norma-
tive inquiry. Nonetheless, as legal theory approaches justificatory or re-
formist projects, the imperative to integrate and synthesize varied norma-
tive perspectives and disciplinary tools becomes weightier. The reason is 
that as legal analysis comes closer to policy determinations, it must account 
for its responsibility in affecting people’s lives (including, recall, by apply-
ing coercive means).37 Ignoring the weight of significant normative argu-
ments, whatever their disciplinary pedigree, weakens the justificatory force 
of the analysis. Structuring the mode of analysis so that some considera-
tions appear only as side constraints on the margins is similarly problem-
atic. A genuine synthesis of normative goals that have been developed, dis-
cussed, and refined by different, often non-communicating, discourses is a 
weighty challenge, but one that cannot be ignored. 
C. Exposing Feasibility Constraints38 
A third economic contribution to legal theory applies even in settings 
where the normative name of the game should not be maximizing prefer-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 34. Id. at 25-26. 
 35. Because “justice is a totally different order of goal from accident cost reduction,” it 
may be seen as a “constraint that can impose a veto” rather than as something to be strictly bal-
anced against the goal of efficiency. Id. at 25. But elsewhere it appears that fairness is in some ways 
comparable with other goals. See Jules Coleman, The Costs of The Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. 
REV. 337, 344-46 (2005). 
 36. CALABRESI, supra note 32, at 24. 
 37. See Dagan, Kreitner & Kricheli-Katz, supra note 3, at 301-03. 
 38. We borrow the term “feasibility constraint” from Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, 
Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 717, 779 (2005), an article that can be used as another example 
Economic Analysis in Law 
577 
ence satisfaction. For any normative legal theory that aspires to policy rel-
evance, the expected responses of addressees (whether private parties, reg-
ulators, or other officials) of specific legal norms will form a relevant factor 
for consideration.  
Well-informed and sophisticated parties are especially likely to take 
law’s prescriptions, even if presented as reasons for action, as incentives 
rather than norms. In other words, they may behave like Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s image of the bad man, looking at norms as a list of prices 
for particular behaviors.39 Legal norms do not translate into their intended 
actions transparently, as many of the norm’s potential addressees and in-
terested third parties may have vested interests in circumventing those in-
tended effects. As anyone who has ever mused about the hairsplitting over 
the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion can attest, such ac-
tion often undermines the norm’s putative goals. Therefore, scholars inter-
ested in law’s expected consequences, whatever their own normative per-
suasion may be, must consider its incentives with particular attention to 
unintended and perhaps counterproductive effects. 
This type of analysis refines the understanding of feasibility con-
straints for various legal rules and standards. A familiar case in point re-
lates to the difficulties of directing distributive outcomes through contracts. 
Richard Craswell shows that “defining a ‘pro-consumer’ distributional po-
sition” regarding warranties is difficult, since such rights affect different 
consumers in different ways.40 Moreover, and more importantly, because 
the rich are typically “willing to pay more for protection against [many 
risks] simply because they have more money with which to pay,” the intra-
consumer distributional effects of many “pro-consumer rights” are likely 
to “favor the rich at the expense of the poor.”41 This means that “the iden-
tity of the winners and losers may be correlated with wealth in a way that 
makes the resulting redistribution regressive.”42 This complexity of distri-
butional analysis applies quite broadly, which explains common econom-
ics-based arguments according to which distributive justice recommends 
using an earned income tax credit, rather than minimum wage, or argu-
ments preferring direct measures, such as subsidies, to improve the income 
of poor tenants over rules like the implied warranty of habitability.43 
                                                                                                                                                                                
for the third genre of economic analysis in law. See also Kornhauser, supra note 6, for what one 
may call “second-order feasibility constraints”—the possible incompatibility between efficiency 
and other normative values—which economics helpfully illuminates. 
 39. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL 
PAPERS 167, 171 (1921). 
 40. Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution 
in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 377 (1991). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 376-77. 
 43. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and 
Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405 (1997); David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the 
Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 389, 461 )2011( . 
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Our point is not to suggest that these familiar economic arguments are 
correct with regard to specific policies.44 These analyses have their weak-
nesses, but for the purposes of this Essay we need not enter the fray. At 
the very least, such analyses make clear that a commitment to distributive 
justice—or any other normative goal—requires theorists to carefully ex-
amine the final incidents of each potential measure.  
The possibility that a specific measure is likely to be less effective than 
its intended aim does not imply that the pertinent normative goal is of ne-
cessity beyond the power of law writ large or even the specific branch of 
law in question. At times, it simply directs the architects of the law to devise 
mechanisms that can serve as countermeasures that change the incentives 
of the parties whose responses threaten to frustrate the measure’s goal. 
These legal mechanisms may take various forms—such as additional civil 
or criminal sanctions or a set of proactive regulatory requirements—and 
they can either supplement or supplant the original contemplated meas-
ure.45 
III. Outside the Comfort Zone 
The second goal of this Essay is to stake out potential contributions 
of economic analysis to legal theory beyond these three established genres. 
The previous Part accepted as a given that economic analysis in law would 
focus, as it has generally, on maximizing preference satisfaction. It drew 
attention to the way that focus may yet comply with the justificatory bur-
den on legal theory. This Part relaxes the assumption that normative law 
and economics always adheres to preference maximization. It thus at-
tempts to drive a wedge between economic methods and utilitarian nor-
mative foundationalism. 
The goal here is to think about the ways that economic methods might 
expand beyond their traditional bailiwick and contribute to analyses that 
consider normative values aside from preference satisfaction. Our ap-
proach here is tentative and exploratory. We touch on distributive justice, 
democracy, and individual autonomy as normative goals whose value de-
pends neither on preferences nor on their contribution to the size of the 
aggregate economic pie. But while we depart from the specific value that 
conventionally guides normative law and economics, we nonetheless hope 
to point to possibilities for using economic methods for further expanding 
the scope of economic analysis in law. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 44. For critiques, see, for example, infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 45. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 38, at 720, 730-36, 779; Hanoch Dagan 
& Avihay Dorfman, Poverty and Private Law: Beyond Distributive Justice (Jan. 2, 2021) (un-
published manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3637034 [https://perma.cc/7L6Y-
5QDW]. 
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A. Distributive Justice 
Starting our survey with distributive justice may seem odd given the 
economic canon in which, but for the tax and transfer system, law should 
ignore distributive concerns. An important argument for this position, 
powerfully developed by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, focuses on the 
“double distortion” problem. While both tax rules and nontax rules distort 
the incentive to work when they redistribute income, redistribution 
through the latter adds another layer of inefficiency, namely, the adoption 
of less efficient legal rules.46 Thus, even if nontax rules are equally effective 
in redistributing income, they achieve this result at a higher cost.47 There-
fore, redistribution via the tax and transfer system provides more resources 
to the poor.48 
Had the discussion ended there, this would have been yet another ex-
ample—indeed, an extension of the one on which we have focused—of the 
feasibility constraint category of economic analysis in law. But the ensuing 
debate belies this conclusion. Critics have shown the limits of this argument 
by demonstrating that under certain circumstances nontax rules (say, tort 
law, on which much of this discussion focuses) are better vehicles for redis-
tribution. The reasons vary, including, for example, the way uncertain 
events such as incurring tort liability are often processed, the political econ-
omy of taxation, and the particularly elastic choice of tax jurisdiction given 
today’s global tax competition.49 The enriched argument refines the con-
texts and conditions under which it makes sense to use nontax doctrines as 
instruments of distributive justice. 
This opening is particularly significant for tort law rules, which are not 
vulnerable to the additional, more specific difficulties of contractual con-
texts that we noted above. Happily, we already have important contribu-
tions that use economic tools to generate insights that may improve tort 
law’s distributive implications. For example, Judge Calabresi famously in-
tegrated distributional concerns in the consideration of different insurance 
schemes for auto accidents.50 More recently, Ariel Porat combined distri-
bution and efficiency considerations in an analysis of the standard of care 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 46. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667-68 (1994). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See respectively Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive 
Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998); Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1649 (2018); and Tsilly Dagan, The Global Market for Tax and Legal Rules, 21 FLA. TAX 
REV. 148 (2017). There are, to be sure, further complications that undermine the claim that dis-
tributive justice should be excluded from nontax law. See Oren Bar-Gill, Willingness to Pay: A 
Welfarist Reassessment, 38 YALE J. ON REG. 503 (2021); Lee Anne Fennell, Remixing Resources, 
38 YALE J. ON REG. 589 (2021). 
 50. See Guido Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems: Can 
Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them?, 69 IOWA L. REV. 833, 840-45 (1984). 
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in tort law.51 In some sense, distributive concerns in torts have become a 
commonplace that places them easily alongside, and sometimes within, tra-
ditional efficiency analysis.52 
Whatever one may think about these particular recommendations—
the validity of their economic argument and how they fare vis-à-vis other 
normative considerations with which tort law should be concerned—their 
ambition is noteworthy.53 Each of these contributions uses a strategy simi-
lar to the feasibility constraints genre but goes beyond highlighting law’s 
limits and constraints. Recall that this genre identifies possible counterpro-
ductive consequences of putative legal rules given their incentive effects 
on parties who are likely to behave according to the preference satisfaction 
maximization model. But the significance of this service of economic anal-
yses to legal theory implies that this type of effort can be, as these examples 
indeed illustrate, more ambitious; that it can be deployed not only “defen-
sively,” but also constructively, namely, for identifying legal rules that are 
actively conducive for the promotion of goals other than maximizing pref-
erence satisfaction.  
These tort law examples, which set the incentives that parties other 
than law’s main beneficiaries face so that they are optimally attuned to dis-
tributive justice, demonstrate one category of cases in which this strategy 
seems promising. One way to think about this strategy is as a “visible 
hand.” It recruits the self-interest of private parties for the promotion of a 
normative goal, but crucially, of course, does not assume that this goal can 
be achieved if only their preferences are properly aggregated. 
B. Democracy: Deliberation and Participation 
Like distributive justice, democracy is an important subject of eco-
nomic inquiry. In contexts ranging from constitution-making to the legis-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 51. Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82 (2011); Ariel Porat, The 
Future of Law and Economics and the Calabresian External Moral Costs, 16 JERUSALEM REV. 
LEGAL STUD. 153 (2017). 
 52. Intriguingly, the impulse for integrating distributive concerns as part and parcel of an 
economic analysis has often been pursued by critical scholars. See, e.g., TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, 
TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (2007); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive 
and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms 
and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982). The intriguing aspect is that critical 
insights often become the basis for reintegration in scholarship that aims at normative reconstruc-
tion rather than critique. 
 53. This ambition can be pushed farther, as it has been in YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND 
MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS (2019), which argues that legal rules can 
be tailored with a view toward direct impact on aggregate demand. Listokin’s analysis includes a 
wide range of examples whose impact on overall economic performance is large, dwarfing the 
magnitude of effects generally considered in typical efficiency analyses of individual legal rules. 
While the goal is increasing demand to improve overall economic performance, the entire analysis 
is driven by the importance of distributive concerns and the intermediate goal of moving money 
to lower-income groups who have a greater propensity to consume than wealthier groups. See id. 
at 175-97. 
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lative process to regulatory rulemaking, local governance, and the work-
place, democracy is often promoted as a central value.54 At times, democ-
racy has been advanced as an intermediate good that ensures better out-
comes, primarily based on some idea of the wisdom of the multitude.55 The 
question of what makes an outcome better is relegated to some other nor-
mative discussion. We put aside these types of arguments and consider in-
stead those that treat democracy as a good in itself, that is, as an independ-
ent value. Without venturing too deep into questions of what makes 
democracy a value, we allude to two aspects of democratic decision-mak-
ing: participation and deliberation. 
While both participation and high-quality deliberation may contrib-
ute to decision-making legitimacy, for our purposes it pays to hew to a 
more direct, even simplistic claim. We posit that participating in the deci-
sions that govern important aspects of the shape of society is simply part 
of the good life. Similarly, but separately, high-quality deliberation over 
those decisions opens them to demands of justification, and a right to jus-
tification over those measures (particularly coercive measures) is a basic 
aspect of self-determination. The good of democracy, on this account, is 
independent of whether people have developed preferences for participa-
tion or deliberation: they may have no taste for them, they may prefer to 
spend their time on other pursuits, they may be happy to free ride on the 
efforts of concerned participants; the good of democracy survives.  
Now, however, the difficult work begins: how should institutions be 
designed in order to incorporate the value of democracy? How much par-
ticipation or deliberation is enough, or too much? How should the costs of 
alternative democratic mechanisms be conceived, in terms of the separate 
elements of democratic value? And how should other, competing values 
be weighed against democracy? The difficulty focuses precisely where eco-
nomic methods might be enlisted to get a better grasp on how to address 
these questions. Designing institutions that incorporate participation or 
encourage quality deliberation is in large part a question of incentives, 
which is the economist’s forte. But because the currency of democracy can-
not be money without undermining democracy itself,56 incentives must be 
conceptualized in a manner that fits the task. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 54. See, e.g., DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN 
EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003); 
DELIBERATION, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY: CAN THE PEOPLE GOVERN? (Shawn W. 
Rosenberg ed., 2007); DELIBERATIVE SYSTEMS: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AT THE LARGE 
SCALE (John Parkinson & Jane Mansbridge eds., 2012); CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING 
TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003). 
 55. This is an argument typically attributed to Aristotle, or in its modern form, to Con-
dorcet. See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Wisdom of the Multitude, 23 POL. THEORY 563 
(1995), for discussion. 
 56. Cf. Hanoch Dagan, Political Money, 8 ELECTION L.J. 349, 54-351 , 356-57 (2009) (ex-
plaining why naked preferences cannot exhaust the language of politics and how the gap between 
preferences and their manifestation as measured by the willingness to pay exacerbates the diffi-
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To get a bit of concrete traction on some of these abstract questions, 
compare two pieces of scholarship dealing with the institutional innovation 
of legislation whose effectivity is projected into the future. For example, 
Daniel Herz-Roiphe and David Grewal theorize “sunrise amendments,” 
or changes to the Constitution that would take effect only after a substan-
tial time delay.57 They recognize that delayed implementation seems at first 
glance to sidestep democratic legitimacy because one generation is legis-
lating for another, but then go on to analyze the conditions under which 
such legislation or constitutional amendment may actually be democracy-
enhancing. Their conclusion is that lawmakers should seize opportunities 
to create democratic renewal through constitutional means, and their ar-
gument clings tightly to the currency of democracy: the costs and benefits 
of the mechanism are weighed only in terms of whether the mechanisms 
enhance or erode democracy itself. 
By contrast, in an economically oriented article, Ariel Porat and Omri 
Yadlin propose using similar provisions to achieve consensus over con-
tested issues, particularly redistributive policies.58 The mechanism sug-
gested is similar, but some differences stand out. First, the goal of the pro-
ject is to improve the outcomes of the political process, and primarily to 
allow for the achievement of transfer payments that advance distributive 
justice.59 Democracy as an independent good is mentioned only to note the 
difficulty that legislating for the future raises concerns. Second, and re-
lated, the framework is geared toward economic outcomes for the groups 
who will be affected by the legislation. The costs and benefits are almost 
seamlessly monetized. The noteworthy point, however, is that the incen-
tive structure for various actors is given serious attention. 
A worthy challenge for economic analysis, as we see it, is to combine 
the strengths of these two approaches. On the one hand, there are grounds 
to take the value of democracy seriously on its own terms, as an independ-
ent good. On the other hand, a deep inquiry into the possibilities of insti-
tutional design begs for an analysis of various actors’ incentives. The diffi-
culty is to account for those incentives without translating costs and 
benefits into a type of currency that replaces inquiry into the democratic 
goals themselves.  
Some economic analyses of legislative procedure take the first steps 
along this path, in particular by considering whether certain procedural 
rules increase the likelihood of deliberation. However, even such sophisti-
cated economic analyses of legislation still consider deliberation primarily 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 57. Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh Grewal, Make Me Democratic, But Not Yet: 
Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975 (2015). 
 58. Ariel Porat & Omri Yadlin, Promoting Consensus in Society Through Deferred-Im-
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 59. Cf. Dennis C. Mueller & Thomas Stratmann, The Economic Effects of Democratic 
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as a means to achieve something else, for example “public spirited legisla-
tion”60 or “aggregate rationality.”61 Lewis Kornhauser’s circumspect atti-
tude toward deliberation is telling: “Economic conceptions of interest gen-
erally exclude the possibility of deliberation over ends . . . . Deliberation is 
unlikely to resolve substantial conflicts of interest. . . . Again, deliberation 
is unlikely to induce [] normative beliefs to converge to a common one.”62 
As long as deliberation is seen as a means to a different end (better 
legislative outcomes or a rational legislature), the complexities of causation 
and representation make it difficult to appreciate its potential. It is thus no 
accident that much economic analysis of legislation focuses intensely on 
the obstacles to rational decision-making in groups, by now classic obsta-
cles like cycling or the inordinate power of organized interest groups or of 
agenda-setters.63 That focus is understandable, even intuitive, because cy-
cling, like similar obstacles to rational preference ordering, threatens to 
undermine majoritarianism, a basic aspect of democracy. If majorities can-
not succeed in passing their preferred measures (precisely the threat of cy-
cling effects), democracy’s most basic pretense is undone. Nonetheless, 
majoritarianism does not exhaust the value of democracy. The single-
minded focus on problems of rationality, which in turn undermine majori-
tarianism, obscures other independent democratic values. 
Deliberation, however, can be seen as its own end, as part of the 
meaning of representative politics. Even if Kornhauser is correct in assum-
ing that deliberation will not resolve conflicts over normative beliefs 
among legislators, its value is not exhausted. When legislators speak to an 
assembly, they are doing more than trying to convince their colleagues. 
They are putting their support for particular proposals in terms of reasoned 
argument, appealing not only to fellow legislators, but just as importantly 
to the electorate. Representatives argue in universalizable terms for par-
ticular pieces of legislation. In so doing, they are appealing to all potential 
listeners to identify with a particular program, but also to judge them as 
representatives, to consider their potential as leaders, as problem solvers 
or compromisers, as articulators of values. In essence, they are enacting the 
aspirational element of politics, inviting listeners to consider their positions 
as well as their character. Legislative deliberation is, or at least can be, a 
site for public articulation of and contestation over normative values, just 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 60. Eric A. Posner & Jacob E. Gersen, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 543, 570-73 (2007). 
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as legal scholars often view constitutional adjudication. Those acts of artic-
ulation and contestation give meaning to politics, and their value is distinct 
from the question of whether they yield better legislative outcomes.64 
A similar analysis of participation could be advanced, though it would 
likely focus on citizens rather than representatives. It is easy enough to see 
that participation entails difficulties that can be termed costs. It is difficult 
to turn those costs into comparable and thus calculable units. Thus far, eco-
nomic analyses have primarily considered deliberation and participation 
instrumentally. But it seems difficult if at all possible to figure out the con-
sequences of more or better deliberation and participation in terms of en-
suring rational decision-making, majoritarianism, and the like. Appreciat-
ing the independent or free-standing value of deliberation and 
participation and focusing on some kind of cost-benefit analysis of the 
terms that incentivize them could then simplify the analysis.65 Doing so 
would allow for an economic analysis of democracy on its own terms, 
bringing some of the most important economic methodology tools into a 
discussion of how to advance democratic values.66 Once an internal ac-
counting of democratic value is established, there will be further work in 
synthesizing different values. This task, always challenging, would be 
somewhat more achievable if the tools for internal comparisons were bet-
ter developed. 
C. Self-Authorship 
The first two categories of economic analysis in law beyond its com-
fort zone discussed thus far disconnect economic methods from their typi-
cal utilitarian normative foundationalism by avoiding aggregation. These 
examples seem suggestive and promising for further applications of this 
strategy in other areas of the law. Alas, there are contexts in which they 
are inapplicable: settings that invite a normative legal analysis where pref-
erence maximization is not a plausible basis for normative prescription, 
and there is no way around aggregation.  
We know of no example of an economic analysis that addresses this 
challenge, but we think it is important, and we hope to convince economic 
analysts to take it on. We therefore present in this Section one timely case 
study for the urgency of developing a strategy that can address this chal-
lenge and explain why, although we do not have a solution to it, we are 
nonetheless optimistic that a solution can be found.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
 64. Cf. RAINER FORST, THE RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION: ELEMENTS OF A 
CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF JUSTICE 188-228 (Jeffrey Flynn trans., Columbia Univ. Press 2011) 
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Our case study belongs to a wider category, and we thus begin with 
this broader framework. Recall that our analysis in this Essay is premised 
on the conviction that the normative significance of preference satisfaction 
relies on law’s ultimate commitment to self-determination and equality.67 
This premise implies that preferences that defy people’s right to self-deter-
mination or might threaten it should be rejected or overridden. This prop-
osition seems clear insofar as it relates to preferences that pertain to other 
people’s self-determination and equality (such as the racist’s). But it is also 
valid with respect to some preferences that relate to one’s own goals and 
plans. The typical hierarchical and nested character of people’s goals and 
plans imply a distinction between, on the one hand, ground projects—pro-
jects that give meaning to one’s life, that are important chapters of one’s 
life story—and, on the other hand, sheer preferences.68  
Neither people’s relationships with their loved ones nor their other 
constitutive features and choices, such as their vocation, are on par with 
their garden-variety preferences regarding mundane goods or daily ser-
vices. This means that any attempt to study doctrines that affect these as-
pects of people’s self-determination in terms of preferences is bound to 
fail, or at least risks obscuring their significance (recall that preferences are 
grounded in reasons) and thus distorting the legal analysis. Where these 
doctrines affect large groups of people, legal theory, committed as it must 
be to serve human ends as they unfold in real life, should study the possible 
effects of alternative legal regimes, and thus look for tools of aggregating 
autonomy (or self-determination, we use these terms interchangeably). 
A detailed discussion of autonomy, or of the way law can and should 
proactively contribute to people’s autonomy, is beyond the scope of this 
short Essay.69 For our purposes it is enough to appreciate one fundamental 
challenge of a legal system that seeks to serve people’s right to self-deter-
mine, to plan and act on their capacity “to have, to revise, and rationally to 
pursue a conception of the good.”70 Such an autonomy-enhancing law must 
empower people’s self-determination by conferring upon them the power 
to make commitments while also safeguarding the self-determination of 
their future selves, thus vindicating their right to rewrite their life stories. 
Since any act of self-authorship constrains the future self, the challenge is 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 67. For a similar position, see, for example, MATTHEW D. ADLER, MEASURING SOCIAL 
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to limit the range, and at times the types, of enforceable commitments peo-
ple can undertake consistent with the state’s obligation to respect both our 
present and future selves.71  
Consider now our case study, which deals with one dramatic clash be-
tween the autonomy claims of the current self and the future self. Think 
about employee non-compete agreements, which have become endemic in 
recent years,72 and focus on those that are not interpersonally abusive. 
Many of these agreements come about where the current self plots a plan 
that is genuinely empowering; the employee who not only earns more, but 
also gains upgraded skills that may open up new professional horizons. 
Nonetheless, where the quid pro quo is a significant encumbrance of the 
future self, even these agreements may, as they should, be subject to critical 
scrutiny. A contract law that takes seriously people’s right to self-determi-
nation cannot remain agnostic towards severe limitations of the ability of 
the employee’s future self to rewrite the story of her life, and this proposi-
tion is not dependent upon the employee’s imperfect foresight or any pos-
sible external effects of the parties’ agreement.73 These are genuinely hard 
cases, because safeguarding the future-self’s right to rewrite her life story 
implies that law limits the empowering potential that contract could have 
generated for the current self.74 
The existing doctrine governing non-competes is complex and varies 
across jurisdictions,75 and this is not the occasion for its analysis. The basic 
thrust of the law in many jurisdictions—examining the reasonableness of 
the constraint in terms of occupational, geographic, and temporal scope—
seems reasonable, and we do not disparage the viability of developing it to 
a set of rule-of-law-friendly prescriptions based on informed qualitative 
judgments. And yet it is hard not to expect that a more rigorous way of 
aggregating these autonomy concerns would yield invaluable insights.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
 71. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Choice Theory: A Restatement, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 112, 114, 123-25 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky eds., 2020). 
 72. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE, 
POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND STATE RESPONSES 3 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/B79Z-XPRA]. 
 73. Indeed, as with other doctrines that need to address the competing autonomy re-
quirements of the current self and the future self, at some point people’s right to change course is 
semi-inalienable. Consider, for example, the strict unavailability of specific performance against 
employees even in jurisdictions in which this is the default contractual remedy, or the semi-inal-
ienability of rights of exit from various cooperative ventures, such as co-ownership of land or mar-
riage. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Specific Performance 37-38, 49-54 (Columbia Law Sch. 
Law & Econ. Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 631, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647336 
[https://perma.cc/K92M-KGA8]. 
 74. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 
386-87 (2019); see also, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, The Case for Noncompetes, 
87 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 969-71, 1029-30 (2020) (explaining how noncompetes encourage firms to 
invest in cultivating intellectual and human capital). But see ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO 
BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 242 (2013). 
 75. See Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 
941 (2012). 
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Autonomy as such is not amenable to any exercise of aggregation, so 
doing so is likely to require a proxy, which unfortunately we do not have.76 
But there may yet be room for optimism. To see why, consider the crucial, 
but all too often unnoticed, methodological move that makes preference 
satisfaction seem an obvious candidate for economic analysis. The com-
mensurability across people, essential to the conventional economic cost-
benefit analysis, is in fact not a feature of preference satisfaction. Aggre-
gating preferences across people is no less mystical than aggregating their 
autonomy. But preference satisfaction still becomes amenable to this exer-
cise thanks to its canonical translation to willingness to pay, which serves 
as its proxy, and is commensurable across people. The imperfections of the 
use of this proxy—notably the reliance of willingness to pay on ability to 
pay—are familiar. And yet, the quality of willingness to pay as a proxy 
whose correlation to preference satisfaction is conceptually grounded im-
plies that where preference satisfaction is indeed the name of the game, 
careful economic analyses can avoid these pitfalls. 
This accomplishment suggests that the conventional presupposition 
that the tool of cost-benefit analysis is necessarily married to the goal of 
maximizing preference satisfaction is in fact unwarranted. Rather than a 
conceptual barrier, we face an operational challenge: to devise commen-
surability-friendly proxies for other goods such as autonomy.77 
Conclusion 
Almost a decade ago, Alan Schwartz remarked that the gap between 
“law and economics scholars and professors who identify with particular 
fields but who are not interested in economics can induce despair.”78 This 
Essay may be read as a response to Schwartz, and as a suggestion that the 
situation might not be quite so dire. We identified and attempted to refine 
the aspects of mainstream economic analysis of law that provide indispen-
sable insights for legal theorists, including those who are not law and eco-
nomics insiders. In particular, we focused on economic analyses of areas 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 76. The proxy would need, as Kornhauser suggests, to untangle the various dimensions 
of people’s self-determination in the context at hand (here, vocation). See Kornhauser, supra note 
6. We acknowledge that our observations regarding the distinction between ground projects and 
mere preferences and—more generally—respecting the hierarchical and nested character of peo-
ple’s goals and plans are only preliminary steps in this regard. But we think that they imply that, 
contra Kornhauser, what is missing is not only more philosophical work. See Tamar Kricheli Katz, 
Response to Jennifer Arlen on The Essential Role of Empirical Analysis in Developing Law and 
Economics Theory, 38 YALE J. ON REG. BULL. 154 (2021). 
 77. Some scholars attempt to forcibly incorporate these values into the economic analysis 
comfort zone by assuming that autonomy, equality, etc., are quantifiable or that their value is grounded 
in preference satisfaction. As noted earlier, we think that these maneuvers seriously jeopardize the 
plausibility of the analysis. If this ends up as the only alternative economic analysis can offer, legal 
theory seems well-advised to stick to the qualitative assessments it currently uses, along the lines of the 
abovementioned non-compete reasonableness inquiry. 
 78. Alan Schwartz, Two Culture Problems in Law and Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 
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amenable to preference satisfaction as a normative criterion, and on the 
power of economic analysis to expose feasibility constraints of legal pre-
scriptions that aim at other normative goals. At the same time, we sug-
gested that economic methods might be apt for examining how values 
other than preference satisfaction, such as distributive justice, democracy, 
and autonomy, can be pursued through law. The goal has been to pull eco-
nomically and non-economically oriented scholars in a common direction, 
in the hope that the interaction might produce new insights, fruitful for 
both camps. 
 
